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Francis Huxley and the Human Condition   
Ron Roberts & Theodor Itten 
  
“Francis Huxley was the most intellectually adventurous person that I’ve ever met.” (David 
Napier)  
Francis Huxley, born in 1923, was the son of Julian and the nephew of Aldous Huxley. He 
was also a pioneering social anthropologist, colleague of the maverick psychiatrist Ronald 
David Laing during the heady and turbulent days of the 1960s and co-founder of Survival 
International.  When he died, in October 2016, his life and work left behind a string of 
unanswered questions, many of which have relevance for our discipline of psychology in 
these uncertain and dangerous times. 
Huxley, described by his friend Rupert Sheldrake as a “feral intellectual” was enormously 
quizzical about the human condition.  Like many before him, he was acutely aware of the 
inadequacies of any one discipline to confront it.  Psychology is considered by many to be 
best placed to interrogate – academically at least – the nature of the human condition.  
Huxley, like many others, was aware of the limitations of this view.  My (RR) late friend, the 
philosopher and artist, Svetlana Boym suggested that perhaps our discipline’s primary 
shortcoming for this task was that it lacked the time and space to tell nuanced individual 
stories.  Too many of us – for perhaps too long – have been subverted by the all-
encompassing imperative to be not only quintessentially scientific but answerable to the 
dictates of the, by now deeply entangled, academic-corporate marketplace.    
Of course, storytelling still survives amongst our ranks – located as often as not amongst the 
marginalised - those excluded from the administrative paradise of reason by virtue of class, 
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, profession or assumed morality.  I would not 
claim the aforementioned list is exhaustive!  Other than the many who struggle to have 
their voice heard and their existence recognised, an additional issue is the nature of the 
stories which their lives beget and the contexts which house them.  As I discovered earlier in 
my own career (RR) when tasked with investigating a pioneering drug rehab in East London, 
the boundaries within which psychological enquiry proceeds may on occasion come to 
resemble social anthropology. In social contexts a strategy of reductionism becomes less 
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and less successful.  Indeed, the crisis in social psychology can be summed up as a conflict 
between those whose interests lie in discerning the relationships between quantifiable 
variables and those whose aim is to understand the meanings inherent in the world. 
Social anthropology itself, Huxley intuited, required a narrative psychological dimension 
more than it required a formalised mathematical one. “God” he wrote “as William Blake 
remarked, is not a mathematical diagram.”  Francis, was in some respects, trapped within 
the intellectual fashions of the day and looked to psychoanalysis to provide the requisite 
‘healing’ qualitative psychological dimension.  This, he and others surmised, might be 
capable of supplying the unconscious gel that would bind together healing rituals, religion, 
the symbolism of the sacred, family structure, the sexual politics of human groups with the 
human body as the ultimate mediator for the journey undertaken by thought from the 
murky depths of the unconscious into the full blossom of social life.   
Unusual for an anthropologist of his time, Huxley had no interest in utilising Western 
colonialist categories of thought in order to mould the customs, habits and practices of 
other cultures into a form which could be comfortingly digested within our own cerebral 
habits.  In this regard he was light years ahead of many of the debates in contemporary 
academia. He considered it was our duty to adapt to the mental templates of others, to see 
the world through their eyes rather than the other way round – a direct challenge to the 
presumed universality of western reason.  Laing described the terror which people may 
have of what their own and others’ minds may produce as ‘psycho-phobia’.  For Huxley, this 
psycho-phobia was endemic in social science, and the remedy for it was not only to embrace 
others’ ways of seeing but to travel in altered states of consciousness, one form of which, he 
considered madness to be.  To embrace others’ ways of seeing however involves more than 
just a shift in perspective. It is a political act which involves work in two directions. Firstly, it 
questions the validity of the opposition between self/us and other, as by embracing the 
position of the ‘othered’ it ceases to be ‘other’; simultaneously this boundary dissolution 
heralds the dissolution of the familiar comforts of ‘home’ thought. 
But if Huxley’s twinning of the ‘anthropologised’ and othered with madness was bold, there 
is a very real sense, in which it did not go far enough.  It is true that Huxley challenged the 
colonial imprint abroad, though its domestic variant, racism at home, went unrecognised, 
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untheorized and unchallenged throughout the entire radical movement to oppose 
institutional psychiatry.  Any awareness of the pernicious and harmful effects of racism was, 
during the 1960s, largely confined to its victims and yet there is also a real sense in which an 
opportunity was missed.  Huxley, Laing and David Cooper were visibly present at the 
Dialectics of Liberation conference in 1968. At this event the Black Power advocate Stokely 
Carmichael (1968) referred to the “mental violence” and “psychological murder” inflicted by 
the White West - not only on African people but on Black Americans in the US.  In response 
to this institutionalised violence Carmichael argued there was a need to develop a 
“revolutionary” and “resistance” consciousness to oppose both the external oppression and 
people’s internalisation of it. Opposition to the violence, Carmichael was clear, did not mean 
adjustment to it.  Despite Carmichael’s presence Laing and colleagues continued to theorise 
the sources of ‘psychiatric’ disturbance in terms of existential-phenomenological and 
familial influences, stretching in Laing’s case to an awareness that the wider systems in 
which family life was embedded, including the global capitalist system were an integral part 
of the context.  Carmichael went much further, describing it as “a system of international 
white supremacy coupled with international capitalism”(above cit p.150).     
Racism thus remained ‘beyond words’ and far from ‘obvious’ to those crusading against 
psychological despair and psychiatric tyranny. Laing’s key intuition that he was involved in 
the study of situations, not individuals and Huxley’s insight that there were meanings of 
madness which could usefully be imported from abroad somehow were unable to 
effectively come together. Perhaps this was because both were already fully occupied 
fighting against their own effective marginalisation from their respective host disciplines, 
psychiatry and anthropology.  Francis was otherwise well equipped to make the leap, and 
was acutely aware of the misgivings of colonialism which had emerged in the 1960s. Toni 
Morrison, some years later summed up what had been overlooked. “The trauma of racism 
is, for the racist and the victim” she wrote, “the severe fragmentation of the self, and has 
always seemed to me a cause (not a symptom) of psychosis.” (Morrison, 2019, p. 177). 
These were, she added “strangely of no interest to psychiatry.”  Until recent years this 
criticism could equally have been applied to psychology, to the extent to which it remained 
in awe of biological psychiatry’s reductionist declarations.   
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So, even as psychoanalysis was brought in to supply some of the missing ingredients to the 
anthropological enterprise, something profoundly important was missing from it.  The 
failure to explicitly map racism was not the only problem.  Huxley’s (1985) talk on 
‘Anthropology and Psychoanalysis’ highlighted a number of excesses in the psychoanalytic 
universe which led to problems in the relationship between the two fields – prominent 
among them was Freud’s insistence on the universality of the Oedipus complex. Although 
sympathetic, Francis had no hesitation in labelling psychoanalysis a “caricature of…a 
philosophical system” which had logical inconsistencies with anthropology.  A critical 
dimension, for both Huxley and Laing, was the necessity to add a practical political element 
to what they were examining.   
Huxley and Laing were also able to intuit that while the facts of life appear straightforward 
enough from a distance – we are born, we age, love, mate, work, play, fight, create and 
eventually die - these facts do not so much define us as a species as highlight the biological, 
social, emotional and creative imperatives which orchestrate our existence.  Some facts – 
love, sex, birth and death – in their intangible enormity, point to an inescapably spiritual 
aspect to the human condition. They also supply the ontological foundations upon which 
psychoanalysis was arguably erected.  Faced with the ineffable mystery of existence, politics 
and the ontology of unending change however, psychoanalysis retreated.  Psychology for a 
long time arguably took the same track. To secure intellectual acceptance it substituted the 
failed aesthetics of a predictable clockwork biology, predicated on Newtonian mechanics.  It 
did so for reasons which continue to haunt intellectual endeavour in psychology. The 
craving for acceptance in the halls of establishment thought.  Perhaps more than most, 
Huxley was aware that anthropology offered clues – shamanism (a topic with which he was 
deeply fascinated) being one of them – that fundamentally different views of reality than 
those present in Western epistemologies had something useful to offer.  To his credit he 
was prepared to work with the ambiguities which come from living and practising in two 
seemingly incompatible systems.   
Our fledgling individual attempts to craft meaning from our presence in the world are 
paralleled by the intellectual, psychological and artistic challenges to make sense of the 
human condition in its entirety – where all these individual strivings merge into a collective 
Page 5 of 9 
 
whole, a puzzle bound by geographical, cultural and historical variations; nothing less than 
the full range of conditions in which we humans are present and which both shape and in 
turn are shaped by the world.  What Huxley and Laing both realised is that essential as such 
disciplined attempts are, they necessarily come up short in the face of the inexplicable 
givens of our existence - both material and existential; what Rebecca Solnit (2006, p.202) 
described as “the mystery in the middle of the room, the secret in the mirror…what has 
been there all along.” Psychology, like psychoanalysis has largely failed to confront the fact 
of our existence in the world as ultimately mysterious and that an awareness of this sublime 
mystery is one of the conditions of being.  Many writers have referenced the celebration of 
this as underpinning what Abraham Maslow called peak emotional experiences. For 
Baudelaire (2010, p.20), it was “the fantastic reality of life,” For Boym (2005, p.503), “the 
ordinary marvellous,” For Arendt, the “miracle” of freedom and for Benjamin (1999, p.63) 
“the renewal of existence in a hundred unfailing ways.”  The mysterious nature of being may 
also lie behind Freud’s concept of the uncanny, a realisation of the fundamental strangeness 
of existing in the world.  Adam Kotsko (2015) has considered this uncanniness, ‘creepiness’ 
as he designates it, as intrinsic to the enigma of desire – that out significant relationships are 
founded on a recognition of the ‘strangeness’, and inalienable differentness of another 
person.  Yet despite all this, there is no place in the psychology curriculum for discussion of 
the unerringly strange fact of our existence.  
Within the broader mystery of our existence are attendant others; our experiential entry 
and exit points from the world vis-à-vis the birth and presumed death of consciousness, the 
nature of experienced time, and the place of love in the fabric of the world.  These are 
central to our experience and understanding of life and cannot be resolved by rational 
means alone – they rather invite an engagement with one’s total being, one that in Huxley’s 
(1974, p.3) words “must be acted out in order to be experienced and experienced if one is 
to make it one's own."  In several works he dived headlong into these waters, charting the 
symbolic roadmaps of world culture, documenting its riches without ever seeking to reduce 
the map to the semblance of anything more rudimentary.  The mysterious, though it is 
soaked in the world of appearance, is not synonymous with it.  In his book the Way of the 
Sacred, Huxley charted the divine iconography and mythic symbolism of the world which 
points us toward the invisible source of mystery. It stands as his answer to the question – 
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what is the world?  It is the world, ready-made, and replete with its own history and peoples 
that we encounter when we are thrust into it newly born; a phenomenology of human 
sacred symbolism.   
The requisite attitude behind a good deal of Huxley’s work is thus a reverence for the 
unknown, an attitude that is antithetical to the epistemologies currently ordained and 
worshipped in the church of academia.  The instrumental bent of the knowledge industries 
which circle academia and the kind of information they demand also underscores an aspect 
of Francis Huxley’s life which we have sought to delineate here.  Huxley’s respect for 
indigenous peoples, their right to define their own life in the way they choose, their right to 
be heard, for their voices to be carried into Western academic and political discourse speaks 
of a demand for knowledge to be allied to justice.  The allegiance to any notion of a pure 
science places considerable obstacles in the way of such a desire. It is no coincidence that it 
is the qualitative realm where distant voices have been raised. Huxley also accorded people 
the right to experience the world in a manner consistent with their own customs.  Though 
we now consider it a distinctly post-modern slant, he long ago saw a place for granting 
different cosmologies rights of co-existence.  Raised as he was in the socially privileged 
bosom of the Huxley clan, educated at Gordonstoun School and Oxford University, the 
distance he covered intellectually and emotionally, in rejecting the ideologically constructed 
norms which bolster the mirage of Western superiority cannot be underestimated.  We may 
ask how far our own systems of education encourage us to challenge our own precepts. 
In our biography of Francis Huxley (Roberts & Itten, 2021) we examined the matrix of 
intellectual, emotional, and social possibilities passed from one generation to another which 
contained him. For Huxley, as for all of us, escaping that web is not possible but weakening 
and mitigating its effects is.  Francis was at times aware that he was trapped, and in various 
gambits sought to escape.  In many ways his life is a calling card to abandon the traditional 
premises on which intellectual merit is assessed and on which higher education is founded.  
Thus, we have agency even if we are not unambiguously free.  We can cultivate how to live 
within the strictures of the given, choose to some extent, using one’s inbuilt and acquired resources, 
what outside influences may be granted entry. He rejected aspects of eugenic thought which his 
favoured uncle and father endorsed; challenged, both in his narrative anthropology and 
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with the creation of Survival International, some of the cultural accoutrements of 
colonialism and white supremacy; rejected the monotheistic centrepiece of respectable 
English society, stood apart from the scientism of his esteemed father Julian Huxley and the 
literary bolthole of his uncle and tried to forge his own way in the world.   
Huxley also challenged the instrumental bent of knowledge in another crucial manner.  His 
LSD experiences and research at Weyburn hospital in Saskatchewan accorded love a pivotal 
place in the human place in the cosmos.  Like Chagall, he believed “the meaning of life and 
art” was “provided by the colour of love.”1  One can too easily dismiss this as a hangover 
from the pop philosophy which coursed through the veins of the 1960s.  One should look 
past such fashionable dismissal. Huxley was extremely well read in cultural anthropology 
and comparative religious thought as well as the wide literature on psychedelia and did not 
make his pronouncements lightly.  He drew attention to an experiential truth which has 
pervaded world thought for millennia; one which may be as crucial for our own survival and 
the well-being of the biosphere as the material logistics of selfishness, promoted under 
conditions of capitalism as a central plank of neo-Darwinian thought.  What Darwin imputed 
into nature, for all its genius, Huxley intuited as arising from Darwin’s own masculine tinged 
view of the world.  Huxley was strongly influenced by the suffering his mother endured in 
her marriage and took a keen interest in the iniquities which women in the world faced.  For 
him, this meant an artistic, even existential appreciation of nature was needed to 
compliment the excesses of an impersonal view of the natural world.  With the intellectual 
heritage of his great-grandfather weighing heavily on his shoulders, Francis used his 
anthropological experience and awareness of the often, personal nature of non-Western 
cosmologies, to balance the formative Huxley picture. His essay on Darwin, published as the 
1950s (Huxley 1959/60) drew to a close, remains bold, original and fully contemporary for 
our age.   
The kind of psychology which Huxley championed and which we endorse is a call to broaden 
the scope of enquiry into the human condition - to forge a greater alliance between 
psychology, anthropology and the arts; one in which research is fully embedded in an 
investigator’s own conditions of living.  In hindsight one can see Huxley’s life and work, as a 
 
1 Marc Chagall quoted in Newsweek (1985) April 8th. 
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fully lived enquiry into the conditions of his own existence – familial, cultural, symbolic and 
religious, a self-designed anthropological program pursued largely outside of academia.  Its 
outcome is an answer to the twin questions of ‘what is the nature of the world?’ and ‘how 
do I wish to be known in it?’  One can posit this exploration as one’s own declaration that 
without oneself, the world would be incomplete!    
The unpredictable and flexible nature of this kind of enquiry, let alone many others, is 
unlikely to ever find a place in the sanctioned habitats of universities and colleges, already 
suffocating under the weight of undue regimentation and compartmentalisation of study 
methods and subjects of enquiry. It is for the convenience of institutions and a deference to 
tradition that the present arrangements are prioritised above any creative inclination to 
teach, research and understand the complexities of human life.    
All this begs important questions regarding the pursuit of knowledge. Just what kind of 
knowledge, what kind of enquiry, what programs of learning, what kinds of academics and 
researchers subscribing to what kinds of values do we want?  Must it all be safe, obedient, 
careful; must we only teach students to follow laid down procedures, capable of 
guaranteeing pre-ordained results within a specified time period?  If so, it will remain the 
case that the existential and metaphysical dimensions of our existence, not to mention truly 
liberating commentary or art, will remain off-limits.  Then, there will be no place for the 
Francis Huxley’s of this world and any vision for what the fruits of intellectual life can deliver 
will be correspondingly diminished.  Fun and love, were for Huxley, essential to both life and 
enquiry. It is up to us to include them in what we do.   
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